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Abstract
We report on the recent Loebner prize competition inspired by Turing’s
test of intelligent behavior. The presentation covers the structure of the
competition and the outcome of its first instantiation in an actual event,
and an analysis of the purpose, design, and appropriateness of such a
competition. We argue that the competition has no clear purpose, that
its design prevents any useful outcome, and that such a competition is
inappropriate given the current level of technology. We then speculate as
to suitable alternatives to the Loebner prize.
This paper is to appear in Communications of the Association for Comput-
ing Machinery, and is available from the Center for Research in Computing
Technology, Harvard University, as Technical Report TR-19-92 and from the
Computation and Language e-print server as cmp-lg/9404002.
The Turing Test and the Loebner Prize
The English logician and mathematician Alan Turing, in an attempt to develop a
working definition of intelligence free of the difficulties and philosophical pitfalls
of defining exactly what constitutes the mental process of intelligent reasoning,
devised a test, instead, of intelligent behavior. The idea, codified in his cel-
ebrated 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” (Turing, 1950),
was specified as an “imitation game” in which a judge attempts to distinguish
which of two agents is a human and which a computer imitating human re-
sponses by engaging each in a wide-ranging conversation of any topic and tenor.
Turing’s reasoning was that, presuming that intelligence was only practically
determinable behaviorally, then any agent that was indistinguishable in behav-
ior from an intelligent agent was, for all intents and purposes, intelligent. It is
presumably uncontroversial that humans are intelligent as evidenced by their
conversational behavior. Thus, any agent that can be mistaken by virtue of its
conversational behavior with a human must be intelligent. As Turing himself
noted, this syllogism argues that the criterion provides a sufficient, but not nec-
essary, condition for intelligent behavior. The game has since become known as
the “Turing test”, a term that has eclipsed even his eponymous machine in Tur-
ing’s terminological legacy. Turing predicted that by the year 2000, computers
would be able to pass the Turing test at a reasonably sophisticated level, in par-
ticular, that the average interrogator would not be able to identify the computer
correctly more than 70 per cent of the time after a five minute conversation.
On November 8, 1991, an eclectic group including academics, business peo-
ple, press, and passers-by filled two floors of Boston’s Computer Museum for
a tournament billed as the first actual administration of the Turing test. The
tournament was the first attempt on the recently constituted Loebner Prize es-
tablished by New York theater equipment manufacturer Dr. Hugh Loebner and
organized by Dr. Robert Epstein, President Emeritus of the Cambridge Center
for Behavioral Studies, a research center specializing in behaviorist psychol-
ogy. The Loebner Prize is administered by an illustrious committee headed by
Dr. Daniel Dennett, Distinguished Professor of Arts and Sciences and Director
for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, and including Dr. Epstein; Dr. Harry
Lewis, Gordon McKay Professor of Computer Science, Harvard University;
Dr. H. McIlvaine Parsons, Senior Research Scientist, HumRRO; Dr. Willard
van Orman Quine, Edgar Pierce Professor of Philosophy Emeritus, Harvard
University; and Dr. Joseph Weizenbaum, Professor of Computer Science Emer-
itus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (Dr. I. Bernard Cohen, Victor
S. Thomas Professor of the History of Science Emeritus, Harvard University,
chaired the committee at an earlier stage in its genesis, and Dr. Allen Newell,
U. A. and Helen Whitaker University Professor of Computer Science, Carnegie-
Mellon University, and the prize establisher Dr. Loebner served as advisors.)
The prize committee spent almost two years in planning the structure of the
tournament. Because this was to be a real competition, rather than a thought
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experiment, there would be several computer contestants, and therefore several
confederates would be needed as well.1 It was decided that there would be
ten agents all together. In the event, six were computer programs. Ten judges
would converse with the agents and score them. The judges and confederates
were both selected from the general public on the basis of a newspaper employ-
ment advertisement that required little beyond typing ability, then screened by
interview with the prize committee. They were chosen so as to have “no special
expertise in computer science”.
The committee realized early on that given the current state of the art,
there was no chance that Turing’s test, as originally defined, had the slightest
chance of being passed by a computer program. Consequently, they attempted
to adjust both the structure of the test and the scoring mechanism, so as to
allow the computers a fighting chance. In particular, the following two rules
were added to dramatically restrict Turing’s test.
• Limiting the topic: In order to limit the amount of area that the contestant
programs must be able to cope with, the topic of the conversation was to
be strictly limited, both for the contestants and the confederates. The
judges were required to stay on the subject in their conversations with the
agents.
• Limiting the tenor: Further, only behavior evinced during the course of a
natural conversation on the single specified topic would be required to be
duplicated faithfully by the contestants. The operative rule precluded the
use of “trickery or guile. Judges should respond naturally, as they would
in a conversation with another person.” (The method of choosing judges
served as a further measure against excessive judicial sophistication.)
As will be seen, these two rules — limiting the topic and tenor of the discussion
— were quite problematic.
The prize committee specified that there be independent referees stationed
in several locations: several in the rooms with the judges and confederates
to answer questions concerning interpretation of the above rules, and one in
the auditorium to serve as a sort of roving ombudsman. I was a referee in the
confederates’ room, and can vouch for the fact that my and my colleagues’ efforts
there were hardly needed; the confederates performed admirably. Reports from
the other referees indicated the same for the judges.2
1We follow the prize committee’s terminology in using the terms ‘confederate’, ‘contestant’,
and ‘judge’ for the computer program entrants, the humans being compared against, and the
human interrogators performing the evaluation, respectively. We use the term ‘agent’ for both
confederates and contestants.
2The confederate room referees, in addition to myself, were Susan Cole Dranoff, an at-
torney at the firm of Ropes and Gray, and Dr. Burton Dreben, Edgar Pierce Professor of
Philosophy Emeritus, Harvard University. The judge room referees were Ned Block, Professor
of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Robert W. Furlong, patent attorney,
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Rank Order of the Terminals
Least Most
Human-Like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Human-Like
B A E D C F H G
Figure 1: Mock-up of the form used to implement the scoring method for the
first Loebner competition. The judge writes the letters corresponding to the
terminals in order from least to most human-like, and draws a line purporting
to separate the computer contestants from the human confederates. In this case,
the line has been drawn such that three of the terminals (F, H, and G) were
deemed to be connected to humans.
Dr. Loebner placed only two restrictions on the setting up of the competition
by the prize committee: that a competition be held each year, and that a prize
be awarded at each competition. The prize at this first competition was a
nominal $1500, although Dr. Loebner has reportedly earmarked $100,000 for
the first computer program to pass the full Turing test at some later running of
the competition. (Costs for the running of the competition itself were paid for
by grants from the National Science Foundation and the Sloan Foundation.)
To determine the prize-winner, an ingenious scoring mechanism was devised.
The Turing test involves a single binary decision, which is either right or wrong.
But to determine a winner, the contestants had to be ranked, so each judge was
required to place all of the agents in order from the apparently least human to
most human. This alone induced the ordering on the basis of which the prize
would be awarded. The contestant with the highest average rank would be
deemed the winner of the tournament. However, this does not allow a direct
reconstruction of the results of the 100 implicit binary decisions that might be
made: which of the agents were humans, and which computers. To allow for this
to be deduced as well, each judge was requested to place a single line separating
the ranked agents into two groups. Those to the right of the line were claimed
by that judge to be humans, those to the left computers. (See Figure 1.) The
judges were told that at least two of the agents were human confederates, and at
least two computer contestants, thus limiting the number of places that the line
could be (rationally) placed. The binary decisions could then be read off of the
rankings by noting on which side of the line each agent fell. This demarcation
process was not used in the awarding of the prize, but was carried out for its
informational value alone.
and Dr. Robert Harford, Professor of Radiology, Thomas Jefferson University. Dr. Thomas
Sheridan, Professor of Engineering, MIT, served in the auditorium.
3
The Event
The tournament was to begin at 1 pm on the scheduled Friday. One room
of the computer museum was set up with ten terminals for the judges, each
labeled with a code letter and the specified topic for conversing with the asso-
ciated agent. In a back room, hidden from the publicly accessible part of the
museum for obvious reasons, five computers had been set up to serve the four
confederates. (One terminal was intended to be a backup, and in case it was
not needed, to be connected to a publicly accessible terminal so that press and
the public could interact with it as a sort of separate Turing test.) In a large
auditorium, the ten conversations were projected each on its own screen around
the perimeter of the room, and A. K. Dewdney provided running commentary.
Unfortunately, there were serious technical difficulties with the rented com-
puter equipment that had been set up for the confederates. None of the three
IBM computers could be made to appropriately interact over the prepared lines
with their companion terminal in the judges’ room. (The two DEC workstations
seemed to work fine.) After almost two hours of unsuccessful last minute en-
gineering, the prize committee decided to begin the competition with only two
confederates in place (just the number that the judges had been told was the
minimum), reducing the number of agents to eight. The time that each judge
had to converse with each agent was shortened from approximately fifteen min-
utes to approximately seven in order to accommodate the press’s deadlines.
The topics chosen by the six contestants were of the sort appropriate for
a cocktail party venue (burgundy wines, dry martinis, small talk, whimsical
conversation, dissatisfactions in relationships) or perhaps, a child’s birthday
party (second grade school topics). The two participating confederates chose to
converse on Shakespeare and women’s clothing. In the end, and perhaps un-
surprisingly, the average rankings placed the two human confederates as “more
human-like” than the six contestants. The highest-ranked contestant, Joseph
Weintraub’s program (topic: whimsical conversation) was awarded the $1500
prize.
The surprises, such as there were, were in the bipartite classifications. Five
judges ranked the top contestant as human, and there were eight instances of
such misclassifications of computers as humans overall. (For the record, the
contestant discussing relationship problems, the entry of Dr. Kenneth Colby,
well known for his parry program, which simulates paranoid responses, was
twice rated human. The simulated seven-year old accounted for the final mis-
classification.)
Ms. Cynthia Clay, the Shakespeare aficionado, was thrice misclassified as a
computer. At least one of the judges made her classification on the premise
that “[no] human would have that amount of knowledge about Shakespeare.”
(Stipp, 1991) Ms. Lisette Gozo was honored as the most human of the agents
for her discussion of women’s clothing, although one judge rated two computer
programs above her.
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Perhaps the most conspicuous characteristic of the six computer programs
was their poor performance. It was widely recognized that computer experts
could readily distinguish the contestants from the confederates. Indeed, many
of the techniques being used by the programs were easily spotted by those
familiar with the eliza program that prize committee member Weizenbaum
developed in 1965. The repetition of previous statements verbatim (subject only
to pronominal adjustments, sometimes wrong), answers transparently keyed
to trigger words, and similar tricks of the eliza trade were ubiquitous. For
example, the following example from the whimsical conversation program is
illustrative of the regurgitation technique:3
01:11:42 Judge 10
It has been a long day! Now I think I’m ready for some fun. The
weather isn’t very pleasant today. Do you have any jokes that could
lift the clouds?
01:13:01 Terminal 5
Everybody talks about the weather but nobody seems to do much
about it. Why do you need to tell me now you think you’re ready
for some fun? Groannnnnn...............
Note that the first sentence in the reply, which concerns the weather, seems to
be triggered by the keywords “weather” or “clouds” in the judge’s contribution.
The second sentence is comprised of the judge’s second sentence, with pronouns
transposed, and preceded by the introductory “Why do you need to tell me”.
Such techniques are subject to well-known and obvious errors, as can be
exemplified in the transcripts of interactions with the winning computer entrant.
For instance, a naive application of pronoun transposition interacts poorly with
tag questions like “aren’t you”.
01:17:52 Judge 10
You’re trying to make this difficult for me aren’t you? I just ex-
plained that I was ready for fun!
01:18:53 Terminal 5
Would you pre]fer it if it was not true that IO re trying to make this
difficult for you aren’t you? I just explained that i was ready for
fun! I am, therfore I compute.... What makes you think I am trying
to make this difficult for you aren’t i?
Similarly, repetition of a compound phrase is conversationally bizarre.
3All excerpts given below are taken verbatim from electronic transcripts of the competi-
tion provided by and copyright 1991 of the Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies. No
changes were made except for the adjustment of line breaks. In particular, spelling errors and
extraneous characters were let stand.
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01:35:26 Judge 6
I can’t say I understand the question...but the whimsy of a poet is
one thing and the whimsy of most of us is another.
01:36:51 Terminal 5
How do you know you can t say you understand the question...but
the whimsy of a poet is one thing and the whimsy of most of us is
another.
One reporter noted that Weizenbaum himself was “disturbed” by how easily
people were fooled by these programs (Stipp, 1991), and more than one of the
judges reported that they were disappointed in the programs’ capabilities after
their expectations had been raised by interacting with eliza in the interviewing
process. Dr. Epstein, in a speech after the event, noted that he had learned from
the day’s proceedings that “little progress has been made in the last twenty-five
years”, that is, since eliza. (We address this dubious conclusion below.)
Analysis
The obvious question, then, is how to reconcile the apparent success of the
programs in fooling judges with their patently low technology. Clearly, part
of the answer relies on the phenomenon that P. T. Barnum used to amass a
fortune. People are easily fooled, and are especially easily fooled into reading
structure into chaos, reading meaning into nonsense. This accounts for the
popularity of newspaper horoscopes and roadside psychics. This is not a flaw in
the human mental capacity. Sensitivity to subtle patterns in our environment is
extremely important to our ability to perceive, learn, and communicate. Clouds
look like ships, and Rorschach blots seem like vignettes. How much different is
interpreting non sequitur as whimsical conversation?
Ned Block, a professor of philosophy at MIT (and by coincidence a referee
at the competition, stationed with the judges) has argued that the Turing test
is a sorely inadequate test of intelligence because it relies solely on the ability
to fool people (Block, 1990).4 Certainly, it has been known since Weizenbaum’s
surprising experiences with eliza that a test based on fooling people is con-
foundingly simple to pass.
People are even more easily fooled when their ability to detect fooling is ex-
plicitly vitiated, for instance, by a prohibition against using “trickery or guile”.5
When I asked Mr. Weintraub during the post-contest press conference how he
4This is not the only case in which exception has been taken to the appropriateness of the
Turing test as a barometer of intelligence. See the discussion in the next section.
5Daniel Dennett, the head of the prize committee, has himself argued against placing “tacit
restrictions on the lines of questioning of the judges”, calling this a “a common misapplication
of the sort of testing exhibited by the Turing test that often leads to drastic overestimation
of the powers of actually existing computer systems.” (Dennett, 1985, emphasis in original)
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himself would have unmasked his program, his response — typing gibberish in
to see if the program spat it back verbatim at a later time a la eliza — was cer-
tainly outside the established rules. In fact, the referees had discussed that very
technique the previous night at a meeting with the prize committee to calibrate
our collective understanding of the rules. I pointed out to Mr. Weintraub that
his response fell under the “trickery and guile” prohibition, and he took another
stab at the question. His second attempt to specify a winning strategy against
his program succumbed to the same problem. (It involved repeating questions
multiple times.)
Weintraub’s problem in answering the question points to the craftiness of his
solution to the Loebner prize puzzle. His entry is unfalsifiable independent of its
performance and solely on the basis of the choice of topic. As almost everyone
has noted who was familiar with the rules, whimsical conversation is not in fact a
topic but a style of conversation (at least as practiced by Weintraub’s program).
And whimsical conversation in the mold of Weintraub’s program is essentially
nonsense conversation, a series of non sequiturs. Thus, when Weintraub’s pro-
gram is unresponsive, fails to make any sense, or shows a reckless abandonment
of linguistic normalcy, it, unlike its competitor programs, is operating as ad-
vertised. It is being “whimsical”. At those times when, by happenstance, the
program trips over an especially suggestive response, a judge can grab at it as
the real article. (The strategy is reminiscent of that used by the program Racter
to create “free verse” poetry, another unfalsifiable genre.) Weintraub’s strategy
was an artful dodge of the competition rules. He had found a loophole and
exploited it elegantly. I for one believe that, in so doing, he heartily deserved
to win.
We might call this winning strategy “parry’s finesse”,6 after Kenneth Colby’s
previously mentioned parry program (Colby, 1981). Parry was designed to
engage in a dialogue in the role of a paranoid patient. The program was per-
haps the first to be subject to an actual controlled experiment modeled on the
Turing test (Colby et al., 1972), in which psychiatrists were given transcripts
of electronically mediated dialogues with parry and with actual paranoids and
were asked to pick out the simulated patient from the real. The fact that the
expert judges, the psychiatrists, did no better than chance, has been credited to
the fact that unresponsiveness and non sequitur are typical behaviors of para-
noids. Joseph Weizenbaum’s response to the experiment — in the form of his
own model of a deviant mentality — parodies parry’s finesse succinctly:7
The contribution here reported should lead to a full understanding
of one of man’s most troublesome disorders: infantile autism. . . . It
6Dennett Dennett (1985) uses the term “parrying” for the Eliza-like technique of randomly
generating a canned response as an option of last resort, a key tool for implementers of parry’s
finesse.
7Dennett Dennett (1985) discusses this and other problems with the parry tests. Arbib
Arbib (1974) presents a contravening view, rejoined by Weizenbaum Weizenbaum (1974b).
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responds exactly as does an autistic patient — that is, not at all. . . .
This program has the advantage that it can be implemented on a
plain typewriter not connected to a computer at all. (Weizenbaum,
1974a)
Post hoc thinking of this sort can go a long way to rationalizing the various
misclassifications of the whimsical conversation program or, in the same vein,
the program that talks at the level of a second-grader. (Who could fail to give a
seven-year-old child the benefit of the doubt?) It leads to noting other insidious
forms of scoring bias that crept into the competition. One possible source of
such bias, for instance, follows from the technical problems that caused two
of the confederates to be eliminated. Once the number of confederates had
been reduced to the announced minimum, it became impossible for a judge to
rationally place the demarcation line between “humans” and “computers” in
such a way as to rate a human as a computer without also rating a computer
as a human. Of course, the converse was not true. This might have accounted
for one or two more of the errors. Dr. Epstein points out in response to this
observation that “(1) Two of the ten judges drew the line after just one entry,
in spite of our instructions. (2) Three of the 5 judges who mistook Weintraub’s
program for a person rated it above one or both confederates. (3) Two judges
mistook a confederate for a computer. In fact, in two (and only two) cases could
our instructions have forced the judge to mistake a computer for a person.”
(personal communication to Harry Lewis, 1992) The third point is, of course,
irrelevant, the first hardly gratifying, the second accounted for by Weintraub’s
use of parry’s finesse, and the final comment is exactly my point.
But post hoc rationalization, like telling your boss off, may be enjoyable at
the moment, but is, in the long run, ungratifying. The important questions do
not involve microanalysis of the particular competition as run several months
ago, but the larger questions of the purpose, design, and even existence of the
Loebner prize itself.
Why a Loebner Prize?
There is a long history of argumentation in the philosophical literature opposing
the appropriateness of the Turing test as a litmus test of intelligence. Certain
arguments against the effectiveness of the test in answering questions about
the intelligence of computers or the possibility of human thought center around
the behaviorist nature of the test. Intelligence, it may be claimed, is not de-
terminable simply by surface behavior. Variants of this argument have been
given by Block Block (1981), Gunderson Gunderson (1971), and Searle (1980;
1984). Others have suggested that the Turing test is not sufficient in that the
behaviors under adjudication are too limited (Gunderson, 1971; Fodor, 1968).
On the basis of such counterarguments, Moor Moor (1976) has argued for a
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drastically limited view of the Turing test, not as an operational definition of
intelligence at all, but rather as a mode for accumulating evidence leading to
an inductive argument for the intelligence of the machine. (See the reply by
Stalker Stalker (1978) and a later clarification by Moor (Moor, 1978) for further
arguments.) Moor Moor (1987) provides a good introduction to these issues.
French (1990) provides a strong argument that as a sufficient condition for in-
telligence, the Turing test is so difficult as to be uninteresting. Nonetheless,
none of these sorts of presumptive counterarguments to the use of a Turing
test are the basis for the discussion in the remainder of this paper. The issue of
whether an operational definition of intelligence is appropriate, and whether the
particular definition codified in the Turing test is too narrow, though important
questions, can be taken as resolved in favor of the Turing test for the purposes
of the present discussion. Thus, we will side with the behaviorist interpretation
favored by the organization administering the prize, the Cambridge Center for
Behavioral Studies. Nonetheless, these arguments do provide another strong
basis on which to question the appropriateness of the Loebner prize. A full
discussion is, unfortunately, well beyond the scope of this paper, but readers
are urged to consult the cited literature. Having sided, for the nonce, with the
philosophical appropriateness of Turing’s design as a test of intelligent behavior,
we turn to the question of whether the Loebner prize competition is itself an
appropriate enterprise.
Prizes for technological advances have existed before, and much can be
learned by comparison with previous exemplars.8 Just as humankind has dreamed
of mimicking the human power of thought, so have we longed to possess the
avian power of flight. Human-powered flight entered the mythology of the an-
cient Chinese and Romans, the designs of da Vinci, yet was only accomplished
within the last generation as a direct result of a prize set up for the express
purpose of promoting that technology. The Kremer prize, established in 1959
by British engineer and industrialist Henry Kremer, provided for an award of
£5000 for the first human-powered vehicle to fly a specified half-mile figure-eight
course. It was awarded in 1977, less than twenty years later, to a team headed
by Paul Macready, Jr., for a flight by Bryan Allen in the Gossamer Condor.
The success of the Kremer prize depended on two factors.
• Pursuing a purpose: The goals of the Kremer prize were clear. At the time
of the institution of the prize, there were no active efforts to build human-
powered aircraft. The goal of the prize was to provide an incentive to
enter the field of human-powered flight. It was tremendously successful at
this goal. By the time that the Gossamer Condor made its award-winning
flight, Macready’s team was in competition with several other teams with
planes that were flying substantial distances solely under human power.
8In fact, other limited Turing tests have been carried out as well. See the discussion by
Moor (Moor, 1987, page 1129-30) for some examples.
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• Pushing the envelope: The basic sciences underlying human-powered flight
were, by 1959, well understood. These included aerodynamics, mechanics,
anatomy and physiology, and materials technology. It was even possible
for Robert Graham, an expert in the field of human-powered flight and
a founding member of the Cranfield Man-Powered Aircraft Committee,
to state at that time that “Man could fly, if only someone would put
up a prize for it.” (Quoted by Grosser (1981, page 23).) Overcoming
the human difficulties in building a team that had collective mastery of
these various fields and the engineering difficulties in creatively combining
them were astonishing accomplishments. Nonetheless, as it turned out,
no new basic discoveries were required at the time of the founding of the
Kremer prize to win it.9 The task was just beyond the edge of the current
technology. Unfortunately, since our ability to dream far outstrips our
ability to build, the establishment of tests of ridiculous difficulty is not
difficult to imagine. At a time when an award-winning human-powered
flight was one of one meter at an altitude of 10 centimeters (the 1912 Prix
Peugeot), the Paris newspaper La Justice established a prize for the first
nonstop human-powered flight from Paris to Versailles and back. (It was
never won.)
The history of human-powered flight indicates that only when the purpose
of the prize is clear and the task is just beyond the edge of current technology
is a prize an appropriate incentive. The Kremer prize is a prime example of a
prize that meets these criteria. The Loebner prize is not.10
We turn first to the goals of the Loebner prize. It was, according to the for-
mal statement in the competition application, “established. . . to further the sci-
entific understanding of complex human behavior.” Along these lines Dr. Loeb-
ner has been quoted as saying “People had been discussing the Turing test;
people had been discussing AI, but nobody was doing anything about it.”
(Lindquist, 1991) The several thousand members of the American Association
for Artificial Intelligence may be surprised to learn that nobody is doing any-
thing about it.
9“The flight [of the Gossamer Condor] has shown that, with what appears to be a com-
paratively unsophisticated design, controlled man-powered flight over a reasonable distance is
possible.” (Reay, 1977, page 341)
10Several other factors markedly differentiate the Kremer and Loebner prizes. First, whereas
the committee administering the Kremer prize consisted primarily of scientists specializing in
the engineering of human-powered aircraft, it has been observed that current researchers in
artificial intelligence, computational linguistics, and natural-language processing are conspic-
uous by their absence from the Loebner prize committee. (This problem has since been
corrected.) Second, competition for the Kremer prize was on an as-needed, as opposed to
regular, basis, and no prize was awarded until the prize test was completed in the presence
of a qualified judge certified by the prize committee. Finally, the successful participants in
the human-powered flight competitions were uniformly groups with strong backgrounds in
the component technologies. In the case of the Loebner prize, the participants were almost
without exception amateurs.
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Others have argued that the prize will serve to publicize the Turing test,
thereby increasing the public’s awareness and understanding of artificial intel-
ligence. Increased public understanding of AI is certainly a laudable goal, es-
pecially since the regular appearance of superficial popularizations in the press
serves more to mislead the public by alternately raising and dashing expec-
tations than to inform it by cogent coverage of actual results. A flurry of the
standard stories in the press like “Computer fools half of human panel” (Gomes,
1991) and “Test a breakthrough in artificial intelligence” (Krasner, 1991) was
certainly one of the side effects of the Loebner prize competition, but perhaps
not a laudable contribution.
Overselling of AI by the media (and, occasionally, practitioners11) has, in its
brief history, been a repeated and persistent problem, and the hubristic claims
of the organizers of the Loebner prize that they are “confident that within
10 to 20 years a system will pass this electronic litmus test” (The Guardian,
1991) perpetuates the hyperbole. Robert Epstein, in his recent article describing
the event, its genesis, and his speculations as to its importance, constructs a
standard claim of this sort:
Thinking computers will be a new race, a sentient companion to our
own. When a computer finally passes the Turing Test, will we have
the right to turn it off? Who should get the prize money — the
programmer or the computer? Can we say that such a machine is
“self-aware”? Should we give it the right to vote? Should it pay
taxes? If you doubt the significance of these issues, consider the
possibility that someday soon you will have to argue them with a
computer. (Epstein, 1992, emphasis in original)
Not surprisingly, the winner of the Loebner prize has jumped on the publicity
bandwagon by taking out an advertisement pushing his program as the “first to
pass the Turing Test”.12 Conversely, a prize whose execution convinces fellow
scientists mistakenly that little progress has been made in a quarter century does
little to promote the field. In summary, there is a difference between publicity
and increased public understanding. Events of this sort — and the Loebner
competition has been no exception — tend to generate the former rather than
the latter.
Dennett has hinted at a completely different goal for the Loebner prize. “It
is useful to have the demonstration of the particular foibles that human beings
exhibit in 1991. . . . We won’t learn much about AI from the Loebner prize for a
long time, but we will learn some non-negligible things about social psychology,
perhaps, in the meantime.” (Dennett, personal communication) For instance,
the competition might be justified “as a proving ground for the environmental
11Dreyfus (1979) provides pertinent examples.
12Dr. Dennett has, on behalf of the Loebner prize committee, demanded that the advertising
claim be discontinued, at peril of lawsuit, and Weintraub has apparently complied.
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conditions necessary to permit the Turing test to someday occur. In other words,
the Loebner competition can tell us what we need to know about how humans
behave in computer mediated interactions.” (Dranoff, personal communication)
This line of teleology for the Loebner prize, that it serves not as a test of the
abilities of the computers but of the psychologies of the various participants,
has often been proposed informally. Such a “conspiracy theory” of the prize as
a vast psychology experiment executed on unwitting and unconsenting adults is
as unlikely as it is disturbing. Of course, there is already an extensive literature
on how humans behave in computer-mediated interactions, and the Loebner
competition is not likely to contribute to it; it was not designed or executed as
a controlled scientific experiment, nor was that its apparent intention, despite
the hopes of Dennett and Dranoff that firm conclusions in psychology might be
gleaned from it.
Thus, it is difficult to imagine a clear scientific goal that the Loebner prize
might satisfy. Turing’s test as originally defined, on the other hand had a
clear goal, to serve as a sufficient condition for demonstrating that a human
artifact exhibited intelligent behavior. Even this goal is lost in the Loebner
prize competition. By limiting the test, it no longer serves its original purpose
(and arguably no purpose at all), as Turing’s syllogism fails.13 It is questionable
whether the notion of a Turing test limited in the ways specified by the Loebner
prize committee is even a coherent one. The prize committee spent some time
with the referees attempting to explicate the notion of “natural conversation
without trickery or guile”. It was suggested that a criterion be used as to
whether you might say the utterance in conversation with a stranger seated
next to you on an airplane. For instance, what might a competition judge
legitimately ask on the topic of Washington, DC? Certainly, the question “Are
there any zoos in Washington?” is the kind of thing you might ask a stranger
when flying to the capital for the first time, whereas “Is Washington bigger
than a breadbasket?” is just as certainly a trick question. What about “Is
there much crime in Washington?” Undoubtedly acceptable. “Are there any
dogs in Washington?” An odd question for an airplane conversation. “Are
there many dogs in Washington?” Sounds better. “Are there many marmosets
in Washington?” Odd. “Are there many marmosets in the Washington zoo?”
Okay again. The exegesis of such examples begins to sound like arguments
about angels and sharp objects.
Similar problems accrue to the notion of limiting the topic of discourse. Is
the last question about Washington, DC or marmosets? (One of the referees in
13Robert Epstein has claimed that “We have changed the Turing test as Turing would
have if he were alive.” (The Guardian, 1991) But it seems likely that Turing would have
appreciated that the limitations imposed on the test by the Loebner committee invalidate
it as even a sufficient criterion for intelligent behavior, and would not have sanctioned such
gross modifications. An anonymous reviewer notes that “none of the conditions assumed by
Turing are redundant for a meaningful test — not the unlimited domain, not the unlimited
time, not the interactive nature of the test, not the interrogator’s full awareness that one of
the respondents is a machine.”
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fact thought that this and similar questions should be ruled out as it was not
strictly on the topic of the city alone.) How about “Are the buildings in Wash-
ington very modern?” Perhaps a question about architecture, as the following
question surely is: “Do you know any examples of neo-Georgian architecture in
Washington?” Are culinary topics ruled out, as in “What foods is our nation’s
capital best known for?” Such issues are not idle in the context of the Loeb-
ner competition. Cynthia Clay, the Shakespeare expert, was asked why Mario
Cuomo has been referred to recently as “Hamlet on the Hudson”. The question
caused much consternation among the referees peering over Ms. Clay’s shoulder.
Her response was “His brooding” after which she coolly changed the topic back
to Shakespeare. Or had it ever left?
The reason that Turing chose natural language as the behavior definitional
of human intelligence is exactly its open-ended, free-wheeling nature. “The
question and answer method seems to be suitable for introducing almost any of
the fields of human endeavor that we wish to include.” (Turing, 1950, page 435)
In attempting to limit the task of the contestants through limiting the domain
alone, the prize committee succeeded in doing neither.
The distinction between domain and task is crucial. Finance is a domain,
but not a task; withdrawing money from a bank account is a task, one that is
achievable through both human and computer intermediaries these days; taking
dictation of a funds-transfer request is a task that only humans can currently
undertake with reliability. Had Babbage limited his differential analyzer to
multiply only even numbers, the design would have been no more successful.
This is a limitation of domain that does not yield a concomitant limitation in
task.
It is well understood in the field that natural-language systems must be
tested using a constrained task. Currently, standard limited tasks can be found
in evaluation of natural-language database retrieval systems (like withdrawing
money from a bank account on the basis of a natural-language request) and
speech recognition systems (like transcribing a spoken funds-transfer request).
The tasks, typically undertaken with limited vocabulary, are easily quantifiable
along several dimensions (for example, technical notions of precision, recall,
overgeneration, perplexity) independently of the subjective judgments of lay
judges. In addition, they can be adjusted to sit just at the edge of technology
(a topic we return to below) unlike the Turing test itself. The natural-language-
processing research community has used such tests for some time now, and there
has been increased interest in issues of evaluation of systems (primarily at the
behest of funding agencies) over the last few years; whole conferences have been
devoted to the subject (see, for instance, the report by Neal and Walter Neal
and Walter (1991)).14
In summary, the Loebner prize competition neither satisfies its own avowed
14Although the limitations and evaluation methods may be more sophisticated, the use of
such task-limited evaluations to guide scientific research may be no more beneficial. (See the
next section.)
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goals, nor the original goals of Alan Turing. In fact, it is hard to imagine a
scientific goal that establishment of the Loebner prize provides a better route
to than would be provided by other uses of Dr. Loebner’s $1500, his $100,000
promissory note, and the $80,000 in ancillary grants from the National Science
Foundation and the Sloan Foundation. (Nonscientific goals are much easier to
imagine, of course.)
Now to the second criterion for an appropriate technology prize, that the task
be just beyond the edge of technology. Imagine that a prize for human-powered
flight were set up when the basic science of the time was far too impoverished for
such an enterprise, say, in da Vinci’s era. The da Vinci prize, we shall imagine,
is constituted in 1492 and is to be awarded to the highest human-powered flight.
Like the Loebner prize, a competition is held every year and a prize must be
awarded each time it is held. The first da Vinci competition is won by a clever
fellow with big springs on his shoes. Since the next competition is only one
year away (no time to invent the airfoil), the optimal strategy is universally
observed by potential contestants to involve building a bigger pair of springs.
Twenty-five years later, the head of the prize committee announces that little
progress has been made in human-powered flight since the first round of the
prize as everyone is still manufacturing springs.15
Of course, a lot of progress had been made in human-powered flight in
those twenty-five years. Da Vinci himself was studying human physiology and
anatomy and the flight of birds, and — although his own work directly on the
topic of human-powered flight, ornithopter design, was essentially meritless be-
yond its decorative qualities — the apparently tangential work was, in the long
run, pertinent to the technologies that would eventually enable the Gossamer
Condor to be constructed. (See, e.g., Gibbs-Smith (1967).) However, over
that period, and indeed at every point during the following four centuries, the
kind of progress that needed to get made to solve the problem was not directly
observable at that time in incremental improvement in solutions to the prob-
lem, the kind of improvement that might be observable in an annual contest.
Nonetheless, tremendous scientific progress was made between the fifteenth and
twentieth centuries. The Gossamer Condor and the digital computer are two
outgrowths of this progress.
The field of artificial intelligence is in that kind of state.16 The AI problem,
like the problem of human-powered flight in the Renaissance, is only addressed
directly and dismissed as imminently solvable by those who underestimate its
magnitude. Progress on restricted tasks in limited domains is well documented
in the literature on applications of artificial intelligence. But progress on the
15Hubert Dreyfus (1979, page 100) has made a similar analogy of climbing trees to reach
the moon.
16Prize committee member Weizenbaum places the state of AI technology a bit later in his
analogy with Newtonian physics (1976, page 199), Dreyfus a bit earlier in his analogy with
alchemy (1965). Neither writer is, of course, sanguine about the prospects for progress in the
coming centuries.
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underlying science that has been made in the last twenty-five years, impor-
tant though it is, is not of the type that allows incremental advantage to be
demonstrated on the big problem, the full-blown Turing test, nor should this
be seen as a failing of a field addressing a problem of the scope and magnitude
of human intelligence. (And like all scientific endeavors, a lot of time can be
spent on fruitless avenues of attack; eliza, as a discipline for natural-language
processing, was such a fruitless avenue. It was quite fruitful in other areas,
however, as cogently argued by Weizenbaum himself.) Indeed, one aspect of the
progress made in research on natural-language processing is the appreciation for
its complexity, which led to the dearth of entrants from the artificial intelligence
community — the realization that time spent on winning the Loebner prize is
not time spent furthering the field.
Twenty-five years of progress in the fields associated with the Turing test —
artificial intelligence, computational linguistics, and natural-language processing
— cannot be summarized in a single program, but is captured in the many small
results, some of which, some day, at an unpredictable time in the future, may
lead to a dramatic demonstration of apparently intelligent artificial behavior.
To expect more is hubris. What is needed is not more work on solving the
Turing test, as promoted by Dr. Loebner, but more work on the basic research
issues involved in understanding intelligent behavior. The parlor games can be
saved for later.
Alternatives to the Loebner Prize
Given that the Loebner prize, as constituted, is at best a diversion of effort and
attention and at worst a disparagement of the scientific community, what might
a better alternative use of Dr. Loebner’s largesse be? The goal of furthering
the scientific understanding of complex human behavior is no less laudable now
than it was before the competition, but clearly, a direct assault on a valid
test of intelligent behavior is out of the question for a long time; even the prize
committee well appreciates that. Thus, any award or prize based on a behavioral
test must use a limited task and domain, so that the envelope of technology is
pushed, not ignored. The efforts of the Loebner prize committee to design such
a test have failed in that the test that they developed rewards cheap tricks
like parrying and insertion of random typing errors. This is an (indubitably
predictable) lesson of the 1991 Loebner prize competition.
This problem is a general one: Any behavioral test that is sufficiently con-
strained for our current technology must so limit the task and domain as to ren-
der the test scientifically uninteresting. Adjusting the particulars of the Loebner
competition rules will not help. By way of example, many years of effort have
gone into the design of the tests of natural-language-processing systems used at
the annual DARPA-sponsored Message Understanding Conferences. The trend
among entrants over the last several conferences has been toward less and less
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sophisticated natural-language-processing techniques, concentrating instead on
engineering tricks oriented to the exigencies of the restricted task — keyword-
spotting, template-matching, and similar methods. In short, this is because
such limited tests are better addressed in the near term by engineering (build-
ing bigger springs) than science (discovering the airfoil). Behavioral tests of
intelligence are either too hard for a prize or too rewarding of incidentals.
At this stage, objective behavioral tests must give way to subjective evalua-
tive ones. A more appropriate way to reward novel, potentially breakthrough-
inducing efforts toward the eventual goal of mimicking intelligent behavior would
be to institute a prize for just such efforts, on the model of the Nobel prizes,
ACM’s Turing award, and similar subjectively determined awards. Rather than
awarding lifelong achievement or past accomplishments, however, the prize could
be awarded for particular discoveries, regardless of field, that the committee de-
termined were of sufficient originality, import, and technical merit and that
were deemed contributory to Turing’s goal (even though they may provide no
incremental edge in a current-day Turing test). To avoid rapt obeisance to
AI conventional wisdom, the awards committee would include eminent thinkers
from a wide range of related fields (much as the current Loebner prize commit-
tee does) but to ensure technical fidelity, a nominating committee of researchers
from the pertinent technical fields should verify purported results before passing
them on for consideration. In order to prevent degrading of the imprimatur of
the reconstructed Loebner prize, it would be awarded on an occasional basis,
only when a sufficiently deserving new result, idea, or development presented
itself. I am not ostentatious enough to provide examples that I believe would
be appropriate for such an award; I am sure that the reader can imagine one or
two.17
As the years elapsed, and the speculations of this Loebner prize committee
as documented in their past decisions began to prove perspicacious, the Loebner
prize might grow in stature to that of the highly sought prizes of other scientific
areas, and so provide a tremendous motivation for innovative ideas in the quest
for an artificial intelligence.
17It is interesting to compare the Loebner prize with the Leibniz award for automatic
theorem proving, endowed in 1983 by the Fredkin Foundation and administered by Carnegie-
Mellon University. Like the Loebner prize, the Leibniz award offers $100,000 on the basis of an
extremely difficult task; it is to be conferred on the occasion of the first major new mathemat-
ical theorem whose proof is found with essential contributions by automatic theorem proving.
However, there are important differences. Awarding of the Leibniz prize is at the discretion
of the Committee on Automatic Theorem Proving of the American Mathematical Society; it
is therefore a subjective test, as it must be to decide issues such as the suitability of the theo-
rem that was proved. In the interim, until the Leibniz prize is awarded, intermediate awards
are occasionally (not annually) presented. The Milestone and Current Awards are conferred,
respectively, for “foundational work in automatic theorem proving” and for “ongoing research
that shows promise”, again at the recommendation of the committee. The Current Award,
as an award for present developments rather than past achievement, is therefore structured
in much the same way as the present proposal.
16
Postscript
The Second Annual Loebner Prize Competition was held at the Cambridge
Center for Behavioral Studies on December 15, 1992. The number of computer
entrants had decreased from six to three, with Joseph Weintraub’s program,
complete with the winning strategy from the previous year’s competition, taking
first prize once again, this time under the purported topic “men vs. women”.
Bigger springs had prevailed.
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